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The return of the broker: consensus, hierarchy and choice in South African land 
reform 
 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 2011 (forthcoming) 
 
Deborah James 
Dept of Anthropology, LSE 
 
Abstract: The broker, a key concept in 1960s and 1970s political anthropology, merits revival in 
settings of rapid social transition. In South Africa, where state planning directs the course of 
change while attempting to privilege the market, brokers do not merely negotiate between fixed 
positionalities of ‘state/market’ and ‘people’. Instead, they embody and bring into being socio-
economic positions and identities. They blend together the egalitarianism and rights-based 
character of post-liberation society with the hierarchy of re-emerging traditional authority. 
Drawing on notions of consensus they embody ‘the people’, drawing on ideas of free choice and 
enterprise they embody ‘the market’. Simultaneously they bear the bureaucratic characteristics 
of ‘the state’. 
 
 
 
Settings of rapid transition, where state planning attempts to direct the course of change but 
does so in a way that foregrounds the influences of the market, have laid the grounds for a re-
emergence of brokerage. Brokers and mediators use assets furnished by the state and provide 
the means for others, less able, to gain access to these. They benefit materially while 
simultaneously developing followings of others who hope to do so. New forms of identification 
are produced even as brokers mediate between old ones.  These key figures emerge in social 
situations which they, in part, have helped to mould. Particular styles are drawn on and new 
socio-economic positions brought into being. 
 
The context of post-apartheid South Africa, like many transitional settings elsewhere, is one in 
which elements of state, market, and patrimonial/patriarchal-style political authority intersect. 
Aspects of  ‘neo-liberal’ (or ‘millennial’) capitalism are prevalent, with many enriching 
themselves and becoming upwardly mobile while others become inexorably poorer (J and JL 
Comaroff 2000). Tempering this, state intervention, much of it based upon a version of state 
welfarism inherited from the apartheid order, plays a key role. Increased levels of 
unemployment associated with market liberalisation have made many people dependent upon 
pensions, disability or child support grants: crucial sources of income in a highly monetized 
economy. The welfarist order or ‘distributional regime’ (Seekings and Nattrass 2005), has thus 
endured, even intensified, rather than precipitously collapsing.  
 
State intervention, as well as effecting redistribution, has been the key factor in attempting to 
privilege the market as a central driver of economic and social life. Where members of the new 
middle classes, for example, have started to enrich themselves via entrepreneurial activity or 
involvement in business, this has been possible only as a result of a government policy of ‘black 
economic empowerment’ which has been minutely regulated, with rafts of new legislation 
having been passed in recent years. Much further down the social scale, the poor people who are 
the intended beneficiaries of redressive and redistributive measures are expected to legitimate 
their claims by couching these in terms of  elaborate and often unrealisable ‘business plans’. 
Alongside all this, insecurities have led people to place renewed faith in traditionalism and 
patriarchal-style political authority (Koelble and LiPuma 2005; Oomen 2005).  
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These different and unevenly blended elements not only provide the context in which brokers 
emerge, but also furnish the bricoleurs’ hybrid ‘toolkit’ from which such figures construct their 
identities. Brokers are not only products, but also producers, of the kind of society in which they 
re-emerge. They blend together egalitarianism and rights-based concerns with the hierarchical 
political authority of traditional leaders and patriarchs, while simultaneously foregrounding the 
economic individualism and choice-orientation associated with neo-liberalism. Drawing on 
notions of consensus, they embody the local concerns of ordinary people, drawing on ideas of 
free choice and competition they embody ‘the market’. Simultaneously, they endorse and 
embody some of the bureaucratic characteristics of ‘the state’ which provides a legitimating 
framework for these merged - but often contradictory – frameworks. 
 
Inevitably, the combining of such unlike attributes presents a picture of moral uncertainty. The 
two such figures described below - Jack Mtsweni and Amos Mathibela -  were heroic in their 
resourceful creativity delivering something tangible to a disenfranchised class of landless poor. 
At the same time, they could be seen as hustlers, exploiting marginalized people to enrich 
themselves and enhance their status. This moral ambiguity has been present throughout several 
decades of scholarly discussion of brokerage.  
 
The anthropology of brokerage and clientelism 
 
Ties of dependency and clientelism have been variously analysed, celebrated and decried by 
generations of scholars. Patron client relations preoccupied political anthropologists analysing 
late colonial and newly-independent countries: particularly those with an interest in individual 
action, such as the members of the Manchester school (Gluckman 1955; Long 1968). Where 
peasants and elites or ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions (Redfield 1956) were newly juxtaposed in 
settings of transition, some groups or individuals acquired the status of patrons on the basis of 
their new access to economic and or political resources, while others mediated between these 
figures and those lower down in the pecking order, often bridging these separate worlds while 
simultaneously deriving benefits from keeping them some distance apart. What underpinned 
such relationships was the fact that clients abdicated their potentially open access to the state 
and/or major markets in order to gain mediated access via a patron (Eisenstadt and Roniger 
1980; Randeraad 1998).  
 
When these and other studies of ‘local level politics’ ran into a ‘dead-end’ (Spencer 1997), this 
was both because Marxist scholars disparaged accounts of individual transaction, and because 
the imposition of political power in the modern state – with its accompanying forms of 
entrenched private property rights and the like - appeared to have lessened the possibilities for 
manoeuvre of any kind (Mitchell 1990). Where such possibilities did exist, scholars analysing 
them were condemned for failing to recognize the importance of political/economic structural 
constraints. The scholarly war between consensus models and those emphasising structural 
inequalities was largely driven by ideological difference. In a well-known debate, Barth’s claim 
that intermediaries canvassed political support on behalf of Pakhtun landowners who were thus 
dependent upon them to build a power base (1965) was repudiated by Asad (1972). Such 
consensus or ‘market models’, argued Asad, downplayed the fact that political authority was in 
fact derived from pre-existing factors such as the ownership of landed property.  
 
This line of argument was animated by a conviction that the ‘choice’ allegedly exercised by 
maximizing brokers and mediators was an ideological construct which overly privileged 
individualist frameworks (Alavi 1973) and obscured darker realities (Silverman 1974). Taking a 
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less condemnatory line, and one more intellectually attractive than the methodological 
individualism of scholars in the Manchester school because of its focus on group practices and 
ideas, was Scott’s work on Malaysia (1972a; 1972b; 1976). Peasants in modernizing contexts 
made appeals to their patrons by appealing to a ‘moral economy’, deriving from their 
dependency upon these patrons in earlier periods (1976). Reappraising Scott’s work, Mitchell 
notes however that although personalized relations remained crucial in political and economic 
life, practices earlier mediated by such relations and by a redistributive ethic appeared to have 
been placed ‘outside the play of local relations’ (1990). He shows how - given the advent of 
capitalism and the emergence of a modern state - power now appeared to emanate from 
somewhere beyond even though it was still exercised locally and felt with immediate effect, and 
power relations now appeared fixed and permanent rather than being personalized and 
fluctuating.  
 
Where, for Scott, these bonds of dependence provided the basis for positive and ‘moral’ forms 
of action, some anthropologists, having a sound grasp of the structural underpinnings of such 
relationships, had been more critical. The self-perpetuating character of patronage in Sicily was 
examined by Boissevain (1966) and later Blok (1988), who showed how many of the conditions 
for which the peasantry needed assistance actually arose because of the patronage/ brokerage 
system or were at least sustained by it; and how patrons, brokers and intermediaries, by 
exploiting difficulties of access, were simultaneously weakening the system of government. 
Similar patronage has been widely documented in Africa, where it has been shown to underlie 
corruption, the failure of development resources to reach their intended targets, and the inability 
of the poorest people to access the rights of the ordinary citizen (Hyden 1995; Mwenda and 
Tangri 2005).  
 
The borderline legality, or downright criminality, of brokerage is one of its problems. But some 
celebrate rather than condemning this feature. Writers on popular culture draw attention to the 
performative skills of ‘cultural brokers’ (Barber 1987; see also Geertz 1960) who creatively 
interweave diverse social and cultural threads in settings of rapid change and urbanisation. 
Given the disintegration of traditional frameworks and the impossibility of reconciling new 
capitalist value systems with the need for self-respect in a dehumanising society, these figures 
must live by their wits (La Hausse 1993). They have little option but to use get-rich-quick schemes 
to make a living, climbing the social ladder while defrauding others as they do so (ibid.).  
 
More recently, analysts of development contexts have recognized the ubiquity and inevitability 
of such brokers, indicating the need to analyse the phenomenon rather than condemn it (Mosse 
and Lewis 2006). In settings where new opportunities may be seized and existing statuses 
transformed, actors construct social contexts, enrolling and juxtaposing a variety of elements. 
One means by which this is done is by the act of ‘translating’ between previously unintelligible 
registers. ‘Actors assume identities in relation to their strategies of interaction … through a 
process of ‘translation’ that permits the negotiation of common meanings and definitions and 
the mutual enrolment and co-optation into individual and collective objectives and activities’ 
(Latour 2000, cited in Mosse and Lewis 2006:14). Rural and marginalized people’s personal 
dependencies may well have been obscured by new fixities of state and market as Mitchell 
claims (1990). Such people nonetheless remain crucially reliant on intermediaries to enunciate 
their demands and claims. In South Africa, former farm-dwellers, evicted from white-owned 
farms as so-called ‘surplus people’ during the 1970s, and belonging economically in the lowest 
income decile, have puzzled analysts by failing to represent themselves politically or to unite in 
defence of their own rights – especially that of acquiring land, whether for cultivation or simply 
as a secure place to live after having been summarily evicted from these farms (Seekings and 
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Nattrass 2005). Instead of organising directly, they remain reliant on ties of dependency similar 
to those analyzed by Scott, but the increasing prevalence of market forces has added an extra 
layer to the terrain of complexity which they need to negotiate. Brokers, often emerging from 
their midst, draw on, creatively mediate, and translate between these varied and often 
contradictory styles and modes of being. 
 
Background and setting: Land reform in the Mpumalanga/Limpopo borderlands 
 
It was for members of this group – both the ‘surplus people’ who had already left the white 
farms in the 1970s to settle in the former homelands, and those still living on these farms but 
without secure tenure – that South Africa’s new legislators and policy makers, post-1994, 
designed a land reform programme as a system both of redress and of redistribution (James 
2007; Walker 2008). Aware of the probability that new forms of wealth would attract ‘big men’ 
or brokers in search of a following, they tried to design impartial processes of land access that 
would put citizens directly in touch with the state and thereby block such opportunists. The 
conventional wisdom on land access in Africa (Berry 2002; Lund 2002) shows how social 
connections outweigh formal titling in importance: but in South Africa, with its centralized 
planning and effective formal legal system, and where the state – as much after as before 
apartheid’s demise – has tried to exercise control over land transfer and distribution, there was a 
determination to counter these tendencies. To this end, new edifices of social engineering 
classified people into types and proposed corresponding kinds of property ownership. But the 
construction of these putative social categories, the accompanying models of property-
ownership – and, in contradictory combination with these, the ultimate reliance on market 
forces to achieve the work of planning – provided new spaces and new repertoires for 
entrepreneurial brokerage.  
 
The context of my fieldwork, conducted in the Mpumalanga/Limpopo borderlands in 2002-3, 
was one of an earlier population displacement for which recompense was now being planned, 
via land reform: one of the intensive planning activities which underlay South Africa’s 
transition from an apartheid to a democratic state. The programme attempted to combine moral 
and material aims. It tried to balance the redress of specific past injustices against the fulfilling 
of demands for broader socio-economic redistribution, thus achieving (1) the restoration of 
property/citizenship rights; (2) the solving of economic problems and ameliorating of rural 
poverty; and (3) the establishment of a class of viable African farmers. These divergent aims 
were equally ranked at an early stage of the land reform program, but the government’s 
subsequent shift towards liberalisation has seen the market-oriented approach gain more 
headway. The varied tendencies nonetheless continue to combine in often unexpected and 
contradictory ways. 
 
Histories of dispossession and settlement: the 1960s and 1970s 
Undoing the injustices and inequalities of more than a century proved to be a complex task. The 
most disruptive episode, and the one most difficult to reverse, was the population displacement 
of the 1960s-70s. In Mpumalanga, Africans who had lived on white farms as tenant-cultivators 
moved off in large numbers (they continue to do so, in lesser numbers, in the present). Their 
eviction, although mostly not forceful, was the result of efforts by a powerful white farmer 
lobby pursuing economic rationalization. In close parallel, apartheid state policy carved the area 
into ‘black’ and ‘white’ zones, establishing South Africa’s much-disparaged tribal ‘homelands’ 
as the place where such former tenants would in future reside, under the rule of chiefs on state-
owned land (Surplus People Project 1983). With reference to the map, Africans were being 
displaced from white South Africa’s south-eastern Transvaal (now Mpumalanga Province), 
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northwards across the Steelpoort (Tubatse) River to the then Lebowa homeland (now Limpopo 
Province). Swathes of the countryside were being depopulated while others were repopulated in 
over the course of less than a decade. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Mpumalanga, showing relocation, restitution and redistribution sites 
 
In the period of greatest upheaval, and despite the apartheid state’s attempt to formalize 
arrangements by settling all displaced people in the state-owned homelands, negotiated access 
to and ownership of land was of key importance for uprooted tenants (Wotshela 2001). ‘Like 
birds in the cornfield’ (Stadler 1979) they sought out places to settle, in defiance of state plans, 
often impermanently and usually in search of a close to jobs and other resources (Marcus, Eales 
and Wildschut 1996). Some of these displaced tenants, instead of moving into the homelands as 
state policy dictated, sought refuge instead on African-owned land within what were technically 
‘white’ areas.  
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The farm Doornkop was one such piece of land. Taking advantage of a brief window of political 
opportunity, its owners - a small group of African titleholders, sePedi-speaking mission 
converts - had originally purchased it from a white owner in the first decade of the twentieth 
century (see Figure 2). During the late 1960s, the farm gradually acquired a tenantry of 
siNdebele-speakers who had been evicted from surrounding white farms. These displacement 
processes, cruel to begin with, were even more brutally interrupted in 1974 when Doornkop’s 
inhabitants – titleholders and tenants alike - were subject to apartheid’s most violent episode of 
social engineering: a ‘black spot’ forced removal using army trucks (James 1983).1 Despite this 
moment of rupture, the patterns of land-based clientelism established here would later re-
emerge, through the activities of new brokers. This, then, is the setting for the drama of 
brokerage and land-seeking described in the present paper. 
 
 
Figure 2: Doornkop group photograph with Pentecostal missionaries, 1910 (photo 
McDonald family) 
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Figure 3: Pages from Doornkop log book showing contributions to farm purchase in cash 
or kind (in possession of McDonald family) 
 
 
A note is necessary here on how ethnic difference relates to the landowner-tenant divide. 
Although Doornkop’s original Christian owners were exclusively sePedi speakers, the tenantry 
living on surrounding white farms until their eviction included sePedi and siNdebele speakers, 
strongly conscious of their differences. Ndebele were considered backward, more traditional, 
less well educated – but with more entrepreneurial capacity (taxi drivers, builders, etc.) - while 
Pedi were represented as better-educated but poor, usually following well-established migrant 
trajectories into industrial employment (James 1990). For complex historical reasons, greater 
numbers of Pedi had converted to Christianity, and a small but significant number had 
purchased farm land in the early years of the twentieth century, becoming titleholders. It was 
Pedi in the latter group that owned the farm Doornkop. But Ndebele have been and remain in 
the majority in the region: a matter which had a significant influence on state policy after South 
Africa’s transition. Although the ANC, in power after 1994, had earlier drawn its most 
influential constituents and its leadership at national level from the ranks of mission converts 
like the Pedi titleholders, members of the small, and new, Ndebele elite were now being given 
new positions of power or civil service jobs in the region (and they in turn had started to 
mobilize new sets of alliances and loyalties, primarily on ethnic lines). In the early 2000s, then, 
the ANC government began to be attentive at local level to the electoral power of the Ndebele 
majority (James 2007:105-29). Such attentiveness was one factor impeding any possibility of 
interfering with the patterns of brokerage described below.  
 
Planned redress: the 1990s and 2000s 
My research investigated how historical patterns of racially-based relocation were being 
overturned by state policy and planning. First, farms in Mpumalanga Province (squares on map 
in Figure 1) - both those formerly owned by African title-holders and occupied by them and 
their tenants, and those occupied by African tenants on white farms – became the object of 
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restitution claims by their former occupants.2 In making policy to govern this process, a law 
was passed to regulate the holding of ‘communal property’, stipulating the transfer of ownership 
of farms to their former owners conceptualized as ‘communities’. In some cases it transferred 
responsibility for development, social services, and the adjudication of disputes to elected 
committees, thus abrogating liability for, even effectively outsourcing, these processes.3  
 
At the time of research – and even several years later - restitution was still mostly under way. 
Claimants, many of them labour migrants working in or near Johannesburg, still had their rural 
domiciles in the villages of what is now known as Limpopo Province (formerly the homeland of 
Lebowa, to which they had originally been displaced) while they waited for the outcome of their 
claims. Indeed, the land reform programme as a whole has tended to have this character: that of 
a process much planned for, with outcomes eagerly awaited but never achieved. (In only in one 
case I investigated, that of Doornkop, had restitution been accomplished and had some 
claimants moved back by the time of my fieldwork.) Meanwhile, tenants and farm-dwelling 
workers were still being evicted from white farms and seeking for places to live. Many had 
returned to ‘squat’ illegally on the African-owned land where they had resided before 1974, 
while others had newly arrived at such places. Former tenants, no longer forced northwards 
across the border as they had been by the apartheid authorities, were now seeking refuge instead 
in informal settlements on the land of African titleholders. Both originals and new arrivals, 
seeking land for cultivation, grazing, and for rent-free residence in close proximity to the town 
of Middelburg, had come to live at Doornkop. The impact of achieving restitution for one farm 
was having unplanned ramifications.  
 
In addition to restitution, state policy established other means of land access: redistribution and 
tenure reform, intended to secure or safeguard the land rights of those who had never formerly 
owned property of any kind – such as the tenants in question.4 Redistribution allowed displaced 
people to settle on formerly white farms (stars on the map, Figure 1), but it did so in a manner 
which combined forces of state and market in an uneasy manner. The World Bank’s ‘willing 
buyer/willing seller’ model was set to be realized in practice via a scheme of government grants 
for individual families (a Settlement Land Acquisition Grant/SLAG of R16,000 - about £1,600 
at the time of research). Purchase of land from ‘sellers’ was possible only if these grants were 
pooled, which led, in many cases, to the recruiting by elites of new settlers purely on the basis 
that their grants, once combined, would allow for the acquisition of a suitably-sized farm. Such 
strategically-mobilised groups, derogatorily described as ‘rent-a-crowds’, often found it was 
unsustainable to live on the land to whose purchase they had contributed: it would then revert 
by default to the original initiator. As some of these contradictions were resolved, redistribution, 
initially designed in the interests of poorer people, began to be oriented towards the provision of 
land for those with greater resources who could utilize them to continue or to create a 
commercial farm venture.  
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Figure 4: South African land reform legislation 
 
In sum, the policy framework and accompanying legislation explicitly aimed to recognize the 
existence of separate kinds of persons with different kinds of rights. In so doing, it implicitly 
separated the types of moral action which accompanied these: historically-based redress, on the 
one hand, and egalitarian-style justice framed to address present-day inequalities, on the other.  
The former was less, the latter more, egalitarian in intent. But the distinction between these 
different aspects and categories of people was blurred. As people aspired to claim land, 
different constituencies had differential recourse to the restitutive and redistributive aspects, 
sometimes pitting them against each other in a series of disputes in which different kinds of 
moral claims relating to property were made. There were loopholes – allowing aspirant farmers 
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with no former basis on the land to try to prove dubious connections to it through restitution, 
while others with a genuine sense of entitlement recognized the difficulties of proving this and 
attempted to benefit from redistribution instead.  And while the state moved in a more market-
oriented direction for land redistribution it nonetheless subsidised land restitution at a 
previously unimagined scale, which involved providing expensive land for free to land 
claimants and, later, barring them from mortgaging or selling the land (see Fay and James 
2009). 
 
Further complexity was evident in the way that one arm of the programme was called upon to 
solve problems caused by the other. In the case of the African-owned farm of Doornkop, a 
redistribution project was designed to solve the tenant/squatter ‘problem’ which had arisen from 
the earlier restitution episode. 
 
This was the confusing framework, of policy/practice, and of state-/market-driven approaches, 
with which ordinary people were confronted when they tried to become beneficiaries of land 
reform. While land access remained a matter of key importance for much of the electorate - 
getting land back, or land at all, was one of the things they claim to have been promised by 
Mandela and for which they voted for in South Africa’s first elections - the exact mechanism of 
land access, and hence the precise way in which property is held, has been a matter of dispute.  
If one model has come to foreground the private ownership of property (albeit by ‘communities’ 
and under the governance of committees as legislated by the state), another - increasingly 
favoured by some of the rank-and-file landless, and often (ironically) using apartheid’s former 
homelands as a model - has idealized land as an inalienable possession which ought not to be 
privately owned or sold, but which should be owned by a very different kind of ‘community’: 
under chiefly custodianship.  
 
Brokers and mediators have found a repertoire in the contested space between these two 
increasingly divergent models or ideologies of property-ownership. These models do not 
necessarily correspond to people’s own former or existing statuses as either ‘owners’ or 
‘tenants’ respectively. In settings of rapid transition, policy initiatives and planned social change 
are productive of new social, cultural and political identities as well as simply acting upon pre-
existing ones. Redressive policies of reform promise to equalise inequalities or transcend socio-
economic categories, classes or identities, while market-driven approaches appear destined 
eventually to reconstitute or strengthen these. But such policies and approaches also mediate and 
transform these inequalities, classes and identities, in the very process of coming into being. 
Brokers play a key role in this process. 
 
The case studies presented below show how, in postcolonial settings characterized by new 
forms of inequality, political life continues (or has newly begun) to be structured by forms of 
personalized dependence. Brokers, even while pursuing their own advantage in what often looks 
like a parody of ‘free market’ behaviour and simultaneously attempting to take up new positions 
in the socio-political order, promise plausible opportunities for their followers. They cobble 
together a collection of divergent discourses and practices, both for their own profit and to 
deliver a series of apparently irreconcilable resources to his clients; more equitable outcomes; 
more reassuringly authoritative styles of leadership; and the ‘choice’ and opportunity of the 
market.  
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‘King Mtsweni’ the land-seller 
On the restored farm Doornkop, titleholder Jack Mtsweni5 sought to legitimate his land-
brokering deals in the eyes of his clientele by cloaking himself in the mantle of chiefly 
authority. A descendant of the original Pedi owners (but child of a Zulu father), he had started 
selling small plots, without the permission of his fellow title-holders and in defiance of the 
official restitution model of communal ownership,6 to Ndebele tenants. Other discourses and 
positionalities were also invoked: in addition to his titleholder status which had entitled him to 
be a beneficiary of restitution, his ethnically mixed family background, and his intimate 
acquaintance with the farm’s chiefly family (now discredited in the eyes of titleholders but not 
their tenants), it was his knowledge of the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution of the ‘new South 
Africa’ which furnished a touchstone of moral justification. 
 
In accounting for the fact that he had invited Ndebele tenants, such as Jan Masina (Figure 5), onto 
the farm and sold plots to them, Mtsweni’s claims echoed tenants’ own endorsement of the model 
which had formerly operated during apartheid, in the homeland areas.  As one tenant said 
We want land to be under government control and that is where we want to stay.  If the 
place is under government, it can always assist us in times of need.  If the place is my 
property, I will have to provide everything for myself, such as buying this and that. I don’t 
want that.  I want the government to tell me:  ‘stay here, there is water, your house, your 
toilet’. 
 
This was a model of ownership which had been established only during the 1930s and 1940s 
(Murray 1992:132) but had by now become firmly entrenched as the ‘customary African’ 
practice.  
 
 
Figure 5: Squatter leader and one of Mtsweni’s customers, Jan Masina (photo Deborah 
James) 
 
Mtsweni had been assaulted, and a charge had been laid against him, for his land-selling practices, 
and for the opposition to the practice of private/exclusive land ownership which this implied.  His 
titleholder neighbours, like M O Mohlala, insisted that the new democratic dispensation did not 
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automatically guarantee all landless a place to settle, and that the rights of title-holders must be 
respected: 
Doornkop is a private land - a bought land. … They have got this wrong. They are 
trespassing - this is private property.… 
 
But Mtsweni asserted that his land-brokering practices were in line with the principles of the 
new political order; especially inasmuch as they embodied that new order’s injunctions against 
segregation on grounds of race or ethnicity: 
People have been thrown off farms, they're suffering.  As a black person I can't allow a 
fellow black to suffer, so I help them to come here. The national government doesn't 
believe in keeping people separate, so why should we keep them separate here?  
 
Endorsing the arrival of these tenants, Mtsweni thus justified his welcoming stance in the name 
of the egalitarianism of post-1994 South Africa. Despite this apparent dedication to a forward-
looking and democratic ideology, however, he was accused by fellow titleholders of pandering 
to tenants’ alleged respect for traditional authority. His appeal as a broker lay in his blending of 
divergent attributes. Apparently contradictorily, he combined the trappings of custom with a 
commitment to ethnic non-discrimination. 
 
His assuming of a chiefly persona was done more on the basis of a borrowed authority, 
however, than in his own right. It was the community’s absentee chief, he claimed, who had 
given him leave to allocate plots on Doornkop. And it was his close association with this chief – 
not yet returned to the farm but living elsewhere - that had attracted so many farm evictees to 
flock to the farm in the first place. His chiefly connections, although allegedly lending him 
authority in the eyes of his clientele among the Ndebele rural landless (typified as adhering to 
customary ways and as respectful of authority), disqualified him amongst the church-going Pedi 
titleholders to whose ranks he belonged. In this as in many other ‘black spot’ forced removals, 
the compliance of the then chief in the original resettlement had led to her fellow titleholders’ 
rejection of her, and of all chiefs, in principle, as collaborators (James 1983, Mulaudzi 2002).  
But these connections were said to have enhanced Mtsweni’s stature in the eyes of the Ndebele 
who were his chief clientele.  
 
Mtsweni’s own account of his connections with the chiefly family stressed the general 
appropriateness of chiefly rule over land, as well as emphasising – counter-intuitively – its 
capacity to transcend ethnic discrimination: 
If land is ruled by ordinary people it will not work. It should be under government or 
under a chief. … It should be the chief who rules here. … I have strong connections with 
him. This place should be under either a chief or government because committees are 
corrupt. 
 
If Doornkop’s restored Pedi titleholders had been predisposed against their ‘collaborator’ chief, 
the present-day willingness of the chief to endorse the taking-in of tenants made their antipathy 
still stronger. Their dislike extended to Mtsweni, whom they likened derisively to an 
authoritarian leader surrounded by his servile and uncritical followers. All newcomers to the 
farm, one woman told me, would be heard to ask ‘ “where is King Mtsweni?” Most of them 
think that Mtsweni is responsible for this place.’ Discourses of chiefship, in his case, served to 
obscure what might otherwise have appeared as naked greed. But chiefship was not simply an 
idiom drawn upon to give him greater authority and hence to lend him credibility as dispenser 
of land. The disguise and the true identity were hard to distinguish, since at least some of his 
proceeds were given directly to the chiefly family. Both Mtsweni, with his new ‘following’ of 
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displaced farm labourers, and the discredited chief who was attempting a revival of leadership 
from amongst the rural underclass, were endeavouring to build a basis for legitimacy.  
 
The broader context – with the chiefship undergoing a revival in South Africa (and Africa) in 
general - undoubtedly played a major role here (Oomen 2005; Koelble and Li Puma 2005). But 
the local appeal of the idea that chiefs could serve their people better than committees (as one 
man put it ‘I would rather be ruled by one lion than a hundred rats’) gave this national 
phenomenon some local purchase. Clientelist ties to chiefs was one among a series of parallel 
routes by which a member of the Ndebele tenantry could secure a place to live, a livelihood, and 
some political favour.7  
 
Titleholders’ views of Mtsweni’s followers’ loyalty to the chiefship may, however, have been 
biased and partial. At least some of his clientele viewed his land dealing more as a commercial 
transaction than in terms of the fealties involved in allegiance to a chief. While his unauthorised 
land-selling had led to charges of fraud being laid against Mtsweni in the Middelburg police 
station by his fellow-title-holders in the Doornkop CPA Committeee, he now had more to fear 
from his customer/clients than from his co-owners or from the authorities. Once his practice had 
been exposed as illegal, they felt they were entitled to a refund of the money they had paid him.  
But the rumour was spreading that he had spent the money. His clients, many of whom who had 
borrowed at excessive rates of interest to pay him in the first place and were still making 
repayments, claimed that if he was unable to pay them back they would ‘have to kill him’. 
 
Despite his bravado, and his impassioned defence of landless people’s rights and their right not 
to be oppressed, Mtsweni seemed to be running scared. At the height of the squatter invasion, 
when he was receiving amounts which started at around R150 (about £1.50) but later peaked at 
R1,300 (£130), he was benefiting considerably from his following, not only because of their 
payments for land but also from their presence as a captive commercial clientele. According to 
squatter leader Jan Masina, ‘he had a big shop when the squatters were still flooding in’. As a 
result of title-holder antipathy to his land-selling practices, and various vigilante tactics used by 
some of them to discourage the tenants from settling, the influx had since reduced to a trickle, 
and his shop was ‘going downhill’. Being worried about the accusations levelled and the 
charges laid against him, he had become more circumspect about his land-selling practices, as 
three of his fellow titleholders told me:  
He will refuse to sign the receipt, claiming that there is something wrong with his eyes. He 
gets it signed by someone else – a relative. Some squatters pay in instalments. Mtsweni 
gives a receipt for the first amount, but avoids giving them one for the second or for any 
subsequent instalments. Or he just uses an exercise book. After two weeks, he says ‘give 
me the slip, I need to fix it’. Then he never gives it back.  
 
What would finally spell the end of this attempt at brokering land deals was the intervention of 
the state. Doornkop’s squatter problem could not be allowed to continue; this invasion violated 
the sanctity of property, as Mr Mohlala’s statement makes clear. Local officials from the 
Department of Land Affairs had, for some time, been designing a ‘solution’ to this ‘problem’. 
But this had already yielded grounds for the further development of brokerage - in which 
aspirations for land access were combining with the recruitment of a potential political 
following; and which paralleled, even if it did not directly connect with, the rise of Ndebele 
political power and influence in the region overall.  
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Amos Mathibela, the bureaucratic squatter 
The Department of Land Affairs bought a farm next to Doornkop to serve as the squatters’ new 
home. Plans were made to have the farm managed, and run along ‘business’ lines, by a 
committee elected from the squatter community: the Siyathuthuka Trust.8 Here was an 
opportunity to put into practice the redistributive aspect of land reform. But it soon became 
clear that there was a need for communication between state officials and the proposed 
‘beneficiaries’ of the project. A spokesman – Amos Mathibela - emerged from among the 
squatters. His followers voted him in as chair of the new Trust.  
 
Amos combined the role of informal leader with that of intermediary and translator for the 
government’s consultant who had been charged with researching beneficiary needs and 
arranging for the development of the new farm.  He had the flair of an aspirant leader as well as 
occupying a marginal and indeterminate status. His charisma was evident in the fact that, 
despite only recently having finished school, he had since his early teens been acting as a self-
styled ‘social worker’ helping to resolve conflicts between local families in the Ndebele 
community, as well as having developed a keen awareness of political and social matters 
through his attendance at Middelburg’s town council meetings. He had also become the 
helpmate and second-in-command to a local Ndebele notable, JB Mahlangu, who was an office-
holder in the office of the provincial premier.  
 
 
Figure 6: Amos Mathibela in front of his parents’ house (photo Deborah James) 
 
It was the need to solve Doornkop’s ‘squatter problem’ that had drawn Amos into negotiations. 
His role in arranging meetings, and in translating and facilitating the ubiquitous ‘workshops’ 
beloved of those in the development field, had won him the trust of the white consultant running 
the project for the local Department of Land Affairs and part-time employment in the service of 
this consultant. His knowledge about the bureaucratic requirements of the state’s land reform 
programme were considerable:  
I was helping former settlers on Doornkop to obtain an alternative piece of land. 
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After the informal settlers at Doornkop heard about my work, they came to me and asked 
me to help them. Nobody was there to help them so I became involved with them early 
this year. … 
 
The squatters have to be moved from Doornkop, but they do not want to move, as they do 
not understand what is happening. They are not educated, they do not know the law. This is 
why they need to be workshopped.  
 
But the workshops were delayed: due to have been held in December of 2002, they were 
cancelled because of Christmas celebrations. There were also delays in buying the new farm, 
drafting a ‘business plan’, and putting the land into the hands of the squatter ‘Trust’, 
Siyathuthuka. During these delays, the attitudes of some squatters – particularly those who felt 
strongly about the money they had paid to Mtsweni - hardened. They decided they did not want 
to move. Amos' attitude to them was quite uncompromising however: they should be evicted. 
He blamed their intransigence on the fact that they were ignorant, and advocated a tough law-
and-order style approach  
No one there knows what is wrong and what is right: this is because no one has taken a 
firm stand on matters of law. 
 
But this uncompromising response to the ‘squatter problem’ sounds puzzling if we bear in mind 
that Amos was, at least by some definitions, one of their number. Indeed, he had been elected, 
by a majority of them, as the chairman of the Trust to which the new farm would belong. 
Although his position as Trust chairman implied his self-identification with this social category, 
the reality was more complex. He had bought a stand from Mtsweni like the other squatters, but 
was using his shack there as a shop rather than a dwelling-place, meanwhile residing with his 
parents in their brick-built house on a nearby smallholding where they were employed by a 
white Afrikaans plot-holder. (In this sense he differed from others in the regional tenantry. 
Neither he nor his family had – yet - been evicted and left homeless). 
 
Amos was now feeling the negative effects on his credibility of the state’s failure to deliver on 
its promise to house the squatters on their new land. Squatter mistrust of their chairman was 
based on state delays in buying and providing houses on their new farm, and these in turn were 
linked to a wider rethinking of the redistribution programme and its eventual abandonment. 
Mistrust was also based on a close scrutiny of the reputations of family members. Amos’ father 
Hendrik had already tried to position himself as a leading beneficiary of land reform in a 
different, more grass-roots and less state-led, redistribution land purchase. But Hendrik had so 
far been disappointed, was criticized for a similar inability to make progress and had been taken 
as an exemplar of the family’s broader failure to deliver to its clients.  
 
Here, a point made by Scott, writing about clientelist ties in Malaysia, is useful: patron and 
client, he notes, are connected by multiplex (and hence flexible) ties (1972). Amos was not just 
a member of the regional Ndebele tenantry. Although for some purposes he was just that – a 
member of the landless eager to take up leadership of a land redistribution project - he had also 
embraced the bureaucratic language of the government, its commitment to a rational solution 
centred on the purchase and legal ownership of private property via the ‘willing buyer, willing 
seller’ model. In a sense, he was the most immediate and available representative of state policy 
to be found in the local setting, and of its embrace of market-driven land acquisition.  
 
It was the fact that he had found a position working as translator/mediator for the government 
which had given him a unique insight into - and indeed a genuine positionality, combined with a 
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flexible identity vis-à-vis - its mode of operation. In the new democratic dispensation, there was 
a commitment to show the electorate that their demands were being taken seriously and, as far 
as possible, that the necessary services were being provided. The ‘participatory workshops’ 
beloved of the NGO sector had now become an intrinsic part of the way the state operated at 
local level. It was not difficult to imagine a time in the near future when Amos, based on his 
proven skills at ‘workshopping’, would hold down a full-time government job. In the meantime, 
he had begun to investigate the possibility of studying law, so the chances of his becoming an 
even better-paid professional before that date looked promising. 
 
Yet Amos also had the flexibility to withdraw from too precise an identification with the state 
and with its market-driven ideology, as had begun to happen when the process was shown not to 
be working. Both Amos and his father Hendrik were aiming to access land; not simply for the 
sake of ‘farming’ (the official government line), but equally for the sake of recruiting a political 
following. Here there was a peculiar circularity. Both needed people, in the eyes of the state and 
its programme, to legitimate their respective bids to acquire land (see Wotshela 2001). That is, 
both needed people in order to ‘prove’ to this overly bureaucratic regime with its commitment 
to egalitarianism, but its contradictory kowtowing to the demands of the market in the last 
instance, that they had enough people on board to merit a ‘redistribution project’. Redistribution 
at this point still involved landless people receiving government ‘settlement grants’ and pooling 
these to enable farm purchase.  Once the two men, father and son, were successful in acquiring 
land, they could then consolidate their command of people. But they needed the people to get 
the land. Hendrik, the father, had already failed to do so. His failure was because of the zeal of 
state planners policing the system: they decided that the price for which the white farmer 
wanted to sell the land was excessive. In this sense, the demands of the market – and hence the 
possibilities for unbridled brokerage - were being curbed in the interests of fairness. But it was 
more likely that Amos, the son, would succeed. He, unlike his father who admitted his complete 
bafflement in the face of the particular demands embodied in the land reform programme and 
the ‘workshopping’ that accompanied it, had successfully mastered both the language and the 
attendant practices of both ‘state’ and ‘market’, as well as having a firm-footed knowledge of 
the Ndebele tenantry with its contradictory love of grassroots democracy delivered through the 
protective embrace of an authoritarian chiefship. He combined these divergent attributes rather 
than merely ‘mediating’ between them. His very persona was, in the words of Latour (2000), a 
zone or site of ‘translation’.   
 
Brokers compared 
A close examination of these two figures reveals some important differences. The former, 
Mtsweni, was a member of the titleholder group who ought by rights to have been more ‘middle 
class’ in status, but neither his origins nor his restored land had assured him a position on the 
ladder of upward mobility. The division between title-holders and tenants was not inexorable, and 
title-holding African communities had long been split between blue-collar labour migrants and 
educated teachers or members of the civil service, with many finer gradations of status and wealth 
between the two. It was from amongst the ranks of the poorer ones, with fewest alternatives for 
rural or urban livelihoods, that Mtsweni had emerged. Closer socio-economically to his clients than 
to his own counterparts, he was also most likely to come into conflict with these clients. His 
attempts at ‘land selling’ and his self-styled chiefly persona were in clear defiance of the rules 
governing communal property, which laid down strict rules for restituted properties, stipulating 
that they be governed in line with principles of participatory democracy – that is, ‘by 
committee’. In the process of this defiance, he exposed his dependents to multiple uncertainties, 
given that the land was not, in fact, strictly his to let or sell.  
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The latter, Amos Mathibela, belonged – albeit ambiguously - to a much lower status ethnic/class 
group. Although its members had benefited from opportunities for some forms of 
entrepreneurial activity in the past (building, taxi driving, etc.), they had not, before 1994, had 
access to political power, but this had newly become possible. Amos himself had no political 
ambitions – yet – but his patron-mentor, JB Mahlangu, was likely later to help him advance. 
Amos’s actions, while respectful of the redistributive and egalitarian spirit of the new 
constitution, were also mindful of the sacrosanct nature of property: both that which the 
squatters were currently illicitly occupying (for which reason he insisted - even though he was 
one of them - they ought by rights to relocate) and that which, under his leadership, they might 
later secure, in line with a state-approved trajectory of legitimately redistributed ownership 
subjected to a valid ‘business plan’.  
 
Where one of these figures seemed to have an intuitive understanding of the aspirations of ‘the 
people’, the other seemed more attuned to the mode of operation of ‘the state’, including its 
foregrounding of ‘market’ principles. Where one was deploying a home-grown solution 
drawing on the appeal of traditional authority, the other operated according to rationalized and 
bureaucratic practices and principles. In both cases, both the initial trust placed in these figures 
to deliver land to their followers, and the later disillusionment, showed that straightforward, 
unmediated access to the rights of the citizen were proving elusive. Those in the lower income 
deciles – such as these displaced members of the tenantry - were indeed failing to represent 
themselves politically or to unite in defence of such rights (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). 
Instead, they were attaching themselves to entrepreneur/brokers who embodied a complex 
mixture of styles: combining earlier models of political and economic dependency with newer 
visions of autonomous self-sufficiency which promised to help them succeed in becoming the 
‘buyers’ of land. 
 
In South Africa, where rates of inequality have increased since the advent of democracy, it is 
increasingly unlikely that inequities of ownership will be effectively redressed through 
impersonal mechanisms of redistributive justice. People’s resorting to dependence on 
intermediary figures to deliver alternative, informal modes of land access must be understood in 
light of this fact. But there are ‘limits to negotiability’ in such land-holding (Peters 2002). 
Disputes, of the kind that erupted in the wake of Mtsweni’s land selling or that threatened to 
disrupt Amos’s plans by making his followers begin to distrust him, have been left to be self-
solved by the newly-titled owner/members of Communal Property Associations. The state, despite 
its hands-on and overly directive involvement in the transitional planning of land reform, has been 
reluctant to intervene in the affairs of these property-holding bodies once land has been 
transferred.9 This may leave governance, here as elsewhere in South Africa, to be mediated by 
ethnic frameworks and the rule of chiefs, real or self-styled. Another possibility, hinted at here 
by the CPA membership's legal action against Mtsweni and by Amos's appeal to the law, is that 
recourse to civil law will be the medium in which governance and politics are played out (J and 
JL Comaroff  2006).10 
 
In such a setting, allegiance to chiefs, other big men, or brokers provides the basis for some 
political and economic gain. The gains are marginal (the land is unproductive, the spoils are 
scarcely worth the taking), but the promise of accelerated social mobility, if not its realization, 
is a vivid one. Although people like Amos Mathibela with his entrepreneurial and leadership 
skills are outnumbered by the multitude of their real or prospective followers with fewer 
prospects of upward mobility, the promise was there: one to be realized (or thought to be 
achieved) via connections to chiefs or to a range of elites or proto-elites in this fluid setting. The 
 18 
forms of representation which Seekings and Nattrass say are lacking for ‘the underclass’ (ibid.) 
thus do exist, but are structured by a revived clientelism which, in some cases, bears traces of 
ethnic identification.  
 
Brokering thus enables a synthesis between divergent and apparently irreconcilable positions.  
A complex interaction exists between three key modes of identification: the hierarchy and 
promise of relative security offered by chiefly patronage; the egalitarianism and 
redistributiveness of ‘rights talk’ and of the new democratic order; and the ‘choice’ of the 
market underpinned by individualism. The latter encompassed both the promise of re-securing 
the ownership of previously-owned property (the spirit of restitution) and the opportunity of 
gaining access to new property for those who had never held it (the spirit of redistribution). 
Seemingly contradictory impulses were merging and being ‘translated’ into one another. New 
forms of identification were emerging, which in turn promised to materialize into prospects – 
however elusive and remote - for socio-economic advancement.  
 
Conclusion 
The co-existence of apparently unlike moral qualities has been a matter of some puzzlement to 
political anthropologists: how can centralized authority and hierarchy on the one hand be 
reconciled with consensual, egalitarian or choice-based frameworks on the other? Some 
portrayals allowed for the coexistence of both within an overarching frame. In Leach’s analysis 
(1954), the variation in political styles was generated by individuals’ power-hungry 
opportunism on the one hand, constrained and challenged by the structurally shaped 
expectations of their followers/in-laws on the other. As anthropologists increasingly concerned 
themselves with the inequalities brought by colonial and capitalist forces, choice and consensus 
were dismissed as ideological constructs masking the true sources of inequality (Asad 1972). 
An emphasis on the structural determinants of power, and an accompanying antipathy to 
methodological individualism, became the dominant tendency in Marxist frameworks of the 
1970s. This led to the virtual disappearance in anthropology of the broker, with his opportunism 
and morally offensive proclivity to take advantage of vertical hierarchical divisions rather than 
organising politically in the interests of group action (Alavi 1973), but other scholars have been 
less judgemental about the moral ambiguities and contradictions involved. I argue that it is 
precisely these contradictions which should lead us to acknowledge and reconsider the re-
emergence of this picaresque figure. 
 
I have here reconsidered the role of the broker, not simply as a figure who stands between 
powerless people and the externally imposed power of the modern state or the irresistible force 
of the market, but – partly opportunistically and partly in response to his constituents’ demands 
- as one who activates the continuing interplay between apparently irreconcilable discourses and 
practices. My argument draws on studies of popular culture, where brokerage was celebrated for 
its creativity and inventiveness (Barber 1987), and those of scholars in development studies, 
which celebrate its capacity to translate across divergent frameworks (Mosse and Lewis 2006). 
 
Am I, then, simply reverting to the argument of the methodological individualists, by pointing 
to the broker’s choice, creative skill, or ability to manipulate situations to his own ends, 
irrespective of structural constraints? If so, does this represent a repudiation of the claim that 
brokers merely operate in a narrow band of flexibility - given that late capitalism has brought a 
new and distinctive political order into being, with its modern and apparently immutable forms 
of statecraft (Mitchell 1990)?) In either case, are both brokers and followers - who try to 
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reanimate ideas of ‘moral economy’ by appealing to and reconstructing personalized 
relationships - failing accurately to perceive the fixity of ‘state effects’ (Mitchell 1999) and/or 
failing to acknowledge the power of the market which increasingly underpins or is merged with 
such effects (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), or are they attempting genuinely to counter this by 
reconfiguring society in line with an earlier social order (Scott 1976)?  
 
I prefer not to side with one side or other in this long-standing debate. Instead, under the 
peculiar conditions which merge aspects of classic ‘neoliberalism’ with those of an 
interventionist and welfarist state, while attempting to force individuals to take responsibility for 
their own wellbeing (see Rajak 2008), I argue that brokers are both product and producers of a 
new kind of society. They re-emerge in a setting where the state intervenes, partly to create 
conditions where the market will have primacy (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) but also to 
ameliorate the resulting inequities through redistributive practices (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). 
The return of the broker is partly, but not only, a response to these conditions. It serves to create 
and perpetuate such conditions, and indeed embodies the contradictions which ensue.  
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1 Farms owned by black title-holders were seized by the state and their owners and African 
tenants loaded into government trucks and unceremoniously driven to villages in homeland 
‘dumping grounds’ (Surplus Peoples Project 1983). According to the Surplus Peoples Project, 
600,000 were moved from ‘black spots’ and 2 million from white farmland, but these figures 
disguise the occurrence of resettlements which were apparently more ‘voluntary’ in nature yet 
nonetheless involved duress. Around 3.5 million were relocated from white South Africa to 
these ‘homelands’ between 1960 and 1980 (Adams 2002).  
2 The patterns discussed here did not apply equally in all provinces. About 70% of Limpopo 
Province province was under claim at the time of publication. Such a scale makes resolving land 
issues almost impossible, since these affect relations between displaced tenants and black 
communities already residing on African land in the former homelands. This movement from 
white farms accelerated the impoverishment of the people already living on such land. Such 
conflicts are not considered in the present paper. 
3 The CPA (Communal Property Association) Bill was drafted and approved by Parliament in 
1995, and the CPA Act passed in 1996. It stipulates that each CPA must have a constitution, a 
system of governance such that individual members elect a committee, a means of transferring 
property upon the death of individual members, and the like. Activists point to the resulting lack 
of clarity on the nature of rights and responsibilities, on how disputes between communal 
owners are to be resolved, and on exactly who is entitled to make decisions about land use 
(James 2007:154-76). 
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4  The policy of tenure reform has given rise to much debate. It affected the land-allocating 
powers of chiefs, with whose powers the ANC became increasingly reluctant to interfere. As a 
result, legislation was much delayed. When it was eventually passed, CLaRA (the Communal 
Land Rights Act) was challenged in the constitutional court. Delays created even greater 
uncertainty for communal area residents, thus potentially increasing the power of brokers. 
Tenure reform is not discussed here since it does not concern the current paper.   
5 Some names have been changed.  
6 See footnote 4. 
 
7 For the link between local elaborations of the chiefship and its national resurgence, see 
McNeill (2007:43-82); James (2007:202-5.) 
8 In restitution cases initiated early in the 1990s, the CPA, as an embodiment of the strong 
communal ethic involved in ‘getting land back’, was preferred and advocated by state and NGO 
officers alike, but when it was realised that CPA ownership often led to a paralysis of decision-
making, a Trust-style legal entity was preferred on the grounds that it would facilitate decisive 
action.  
9 The government’s failure to protect the rights of such property-owners may in part be 
explained by its unwillingness to be seen as an evicter of squatters and therefore as having 
similarities to the apartheid regime: particularly if doing so would alienate the political support 
of the landless (mostly Ndebele-speaking) majority.  
10 Something of this kind occurred in other land reform cases in SA, particularly in the court 
challenge to the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 brought by several communities which 
had received land under land reform. 
